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Abstract In response to the attacks on the sovereign debt of some Eurozone countries,
European Union (EU) leaders have created a set of preventive and corrective policy
instruments to coordinate macro-economic policies and reforms. In this article, we deal
with the European Semester, a cycle of information exchange, monitoring and surveillance.
Countries that deviate from the targets are subjected to increasing monitoring and more
severe ‘corrective’ interventions, in a pyramid of responsive exchanges between govern-
ments and EU institutions. This is supposed to generate coordination and convergence
towards balanced economies via mechanisms of learning. But who is learning what? Can
the EU learn in the ‘wrong’ mode? We contribute to the literature on theories of the policy
process by showing how modes of learning can be operationalized and used in empirical
analysis. We use policy learning as theoretical framework to establish empirically the
prevalent mode of learning and its implications for both the power of the Commission and
the normative question of whether the EU is learning in the ‘correct’ mode.
Keywords Ambiguity  European Semester  European Union (EU)  Eurozone crisis 
Fiscal policy  Policy learning
Introduction and motivation
Since the early days of policy analysis and organizational theory, there has been substantial
academic interest in the concept of policy learning to explain change particularly under
conditions of ambiguity (Cyert and March 1963; Lindblom 1959). Indeed, learning seems a
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suitable way to theorize how constellations of actors manipulate the social construction of
policy problems, exploit opportunities for entrepreneurship, and actively use institutions
and decision-making.
The European Union (EU) provides a strong most-likely case for the study of collective
learning—as defined in Heikkila and Gerlak (2013). This is for two reasons. First, because
of its democratic deficit, the EU, especially its bureaucracy, the European Commission,
seeks to create legitimacy by drawing on expertise (Verdun 1999; Zito 2001), technical–
economic efficiency (Majone 1996) and policy transfer (Zito and Schout 2009). EU policy
reforms are often presented in the language of efficiency and learning from ‘best evidence’.
But second, and more substantively, EU policy-making is characterized by high levels of
ambiguity (Zahariadis 2008). Often EU institutions agree on a decision, but disagree on the
implications of the decisions (Howorth 2004). In implementing these decisions, actors may
be strategic, but (because of ambiguity) they ‘gamble’ rather than ‘calculating’ (Jabko
2006). Interpretations, ideas and social constructions matter in these contexts of strategic
interaction—a territory where theories of policy learning perform well (Freeman 2006;
Heikkila and Gerlak 2013).
Since 2008, the sovereign debt crisis has forced the EU to adjust existing policy
instruments and design new ones, radically changing how information is generated and
acquired for the purposes of monitoring and surveillance. Information acquisition is a
fundamental component of collective leaning (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, see below). The
introduction of new information-rich instrumentation draws on existing frameworks,
notably the stability and growth pact (SGP) (de la Porte and Heins 2015; Ioannou et al.
2015; Salines et al. 2012). But, taken together the information environment and the rules
for sanctioning deviant behaviour are qualitatively different from the pre-crisis situation.
For policy-makers, the key question is whether the new governance architecture works
or not. Do governments exploit ambiguity, re-negotiating everything that was agreed at the
stage of decision-making? Are they converging towards post-austerity economic para-
digms instead? Do they change their preferences about budgets and structural reforms? Or,
does compliance with the policy instruments for fiscal coordination follow the lines of rule-
bound, hierarchical decision-making? All these options make us think in different ways.
We offer a theoretical lens—a framework—to answer these questions empirically. Our
framework is policy learning. Doubts and concerns about the values of learning theories
loom large (Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992). Political scientists agonize about
whether the EU learns or not a kind of ‘essentialist’ or ‘ontological question’. They get into
troubled waters when they have to explain whether a given episode of change is caused by
policy learning and not by another variable—an empirical question. At their roots, these
are YES/NO questions. Here, we suggest a different way of looking at policy learning. In
doing so, we follow Birchfield (2013): in her analysis of ‘normative power Europe’ she
found exactly the same problem of YES/NO questions. To break this impasse, she moves
away from these binary questions by taking normative power Europe as framework for the
study of the policy process. We do the same for policy learning. We do not try to answer
questions about the nature of the EU or the presence–absence of learning. Instead, we start
from policy learning as framework and show what can be done with it. Following
Birchfield (who draws on Sabatier 2007), a framework for the analysis of the policy
process should allow us to elaborate concepts that support conjectures that can be tested
empirically. It should provide explanatory leverage. It can also allow researchers to
elaborate on the normative implications of their findings (Birchfield 2013: 912).
Our contribution to the literature is theoretical and empirical. Empirically, we show how
learning as framework allows us to answer positive questions (and explore their normative
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implications) about the European Semester, the annual cycle of monitoring and coordi-
nation of fiscal policy and structural policy reforms across the EU. Theoretically, our main
contribution is to develop conjectures that can be tested empirically (Sabatier’s first cri-
terion for a framework) by adopting a ‘varieties of learning’ framework that up until now
has been formulated only in abstract, conceptual terms (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013).
In the section ‘From literature to learning-as-framework’, we illustrate the literature,
build our conceptual framework and outline the research design. Then in ‘The European
Semester’ introduces information on the European Semester. The section entitled ‘Find-
ings’ is empirical and is dedicated to France and Italy in the annual cycle of EU policy
coordination. We use empirical evidence to show how our approach works empirically,
concluding that overall the EU is learning in hierarchical and bargaining modes. We then
reflect on the implications for the agency of the Commission and power shifts, and con-
clude with policy recommendations. We finally ask whether these modes are functional—
we suggest they are not, because the conditions for their efficient usages are not met (see
‘Discussion and conclusions’).
From literature to learning-as-framework
There has been fast growth in the academic literature on the responses to the economic and
political crisis of the EU (Ioannou et al. 2015; Tosun et al. 2014), but so far there are no
studies tackling ambiguity upfront, and no attempt to use policy learning explicitly. This is
odd because—as noted by Heikkila and Gerlak (2013)—crises are often exogenous triggers
of learning processes and the EU is no exception (Tosun et al. 2014).
Extant literature examines: the causes and the unfolding of the international financial
crisis across the EU and its member states (Hardie and Howarth 2013); the regulatory
response to the financial crisis in the EU and its member states (Moschella and Tsingou
2013; Quaglia 2012); the building up of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone (Dyson
2014; Tsoukalis 2011) and its cross-country effects (van Hooren et al. 2014); instrument
change such as the fiscal compact (Chang 2013), the European Stability Mechanism and its
forerunner (Gocaj and Meunier 2013); governance issues (Tosun et al. 2014), institutional
change such as the role played by the European Central Bank (Salines et al. 2012) and the
European Commission (Schwarzer 2012); inter-governmental deliberation (Puetter 2012;
Schimmelfennig 2015); and finally, the social dimension of the crisis (Copeland 2015).
In terms of explicit policy theories, there is a multiple streams analysis of the changing
vision for policy reforms in the EU (Copeland and James 2014). Others have drawn on
different theoretical frameworks, such as principal-agent analysis (Savage and Verdun
2015) and European integration theories (Ioannou et al. 2015; Schimmelfennig 2014, 2015;
Vilpisˇauskas 2013), without getting into policy theories explicitly. A bit closer to learning
theories are those who have addressed the ideational aspects (Blyth 2013) and the narrative
dimension of austerity (Schmidt 2013). But, policy learning as theoretical lens remains
uncharted territory in this field of studies on the EU and the ‘crisis’—apart from some
observations in Neimann and Ioannou (2015).
If, instead, we pan out to the more general literature in EU policy studies, we find that
‘learning instructions’ or ‘learning from the top’ are used frequently to explain how targets
and indicators impact on domestic policy choice via processes of decoding, interpretation,
editing and creative manipulation (Radaelli 2008). Added to that, learning underpins
several theories of policy process. The question then is why is learning rarely used ‘on its
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own’? We reason that learning is more than a component of existing theories of the policy
process. It can be a proper framework for the study of the policy process. The challenge is
to develop concepts and identify theoretical leverage, test conjectures empirically and,
possibly, explore the normative implications of the findings with the aid of the framework.
We follow Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) who distinguish between actors (in our case a
government, or a Prime Minister) and the system (learning in the European Semester);
between the process of learning and the products of learning; and, within learning pro-
cesses, between acquisition of information, translation and dissemination. We are emi-
nently interested in the process of learning, because, once we have adopted learning as
framework (as opposed to learning as an essentialist YES/NO question), the key question is
whether we can characterize and identify the process of learning. For us, this means that
empirically we set out to establish whether there is a prevalent mode of learning in the
European Semester, or more specifically in the episodes and time period we examine. This
is different from an analysis of the products of learning. To illustrate, one can show that the
dominant mode of learning is, for example, reflexivity, but whether this also leads to all or
some governments of the EU to learn how to converge on fiscal and structural policies is
another, different empirical question—a question that will be answered in the future, when
the EU reaches its own self-imposed deadlines for convergence (the year 2020).
Turning to the development of concepts within a framework, what modes of learning do
we expect to observe, then? Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) generate four learning types by
using two variables. One is the social certification of actors: Is there a socially certified
actor that stands out from the crowd in a given social interaction? One can think of
organizations like the European Central Bank or the epistemic community of austerity
economics (Blyth 2013). The other variable is problem tractability—some policy problems
are ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973), others have their own stable technologies, a few
even have algorithms leading to predictable solutions. Problem tractability under condi-
tions of ambiguity is, at least in part, socially constructed. It is not an absolute given, as
demonstrated by the hot debates on whether ‘social investment’ is a solution to the problem
of growth or it aggravates budgetary problems.1
By combining the two variables, Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) generate four varieties or
modes of learning. They are reflexivity, (pluralistic) bargaining, epistemic and hierarchical
learning. Learning as social process can either take place in a policy sub-system or
organization where an actor has a socially privileged position in relation to knowledge—
imagine a ‘teacher’, an ‘expert’, a central bank (epistemic), but also a Court or the
European Commission (hierarchical). Or, at the opposite, learning can occur in a con-
stellation of actors that are somewhat equal in relation to how society values their
knowledge. This is true of situations of reflexivity and bargaining, when every actor in a
given constellation has to accept that any other actor may come up with ‘the best argu-
ment’ (reflexivity) or there is a pluralist setting with no monopolistic position (bargaining).
As for problem tractability in our empirical context, we observe variation from total
lack of ‘know how’ (in the hardest days of speculative attacks on sovereign debt) to the
emergence of instruments of monitoring and fiscal surveillance. When these instruments
are used, actors still argue over the meaning of some aspects of the deficit procedures and
1 Social investment is about increasing the skills and capability of people so that they can fully participate to
social life and in the labour market (Kvist 2015; Morel et al. 2014). The Commission presented the social
investment strategy in February 2013 (one communication, a recommendation and eight staff papers). The
Council endorsed it in October 2013, and in 2014 the Commission informed its Annual Growth Strategy
with the objectives of the social investment strategy.
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how the European Commission and the EU Ministers interpret them. Some think that an
excessive deficit triggers a ‘flow-chart’: ‘if you do this, we will not let you do that’. Yet,
others think the deficit procedure opens room for negotiation, dialogue, perhaps even
reflexivity: ‘if you do this, we want to talk to you about that by using our power of
surveillance’.
Our inquiry is designed to explore the relationship between the annual cycle of policy
coordination and learning, and to answer a question about the dominant learning type(s) in
the European Semester. This is our research question. But, the answer to this question will
also allow us to draw implications about the agenda-setting power of different actors,
specifically the Commission and therefore link our analysis to more ambitious questions
about power. Of course, a power analysis should take the position of EU institutions and
member states pre-crisis, and examine how power has changed with the crisis, attributing
these changes to learning or other variables. Hence we can only dig on the implications of
our analysis, instead of providing a power-centred analysis. We will also draw on the
findings to investigate the normative dimension of learning-as-framework. To achieve this,
we will elaborate in the conclusions of whether the prevalent mode of learning is functional
for the EU as complex organization, or the EU is learning in the wrong mode so to speak.
For our empirical analysis, we need expectations. Following Dunlop and Radaelli
(2013, pp. 603–604) and Heikkila and Gerlak’s threefold categorization (acquisition,
translation and dissemination), we reason that collective learning in the European Semester
can occur in the following varieties or modes:
• Hierarchically: in a hierarchical mode, we expect the EU institutions to use policy
instruments as set of rules, and steer the process from the ‘top’ in the most
predictable ways, minimizing negotiations and exceptions to the rules. Learning is
about gathering information centrally and translating and disseminating it via
instructions supported by incentives and sanctions.
• As by-product of bargaining: while learning through bargaining may appear counter-
intuitive, negotiation can generate information and update thinking in ways that would
not have happened in its absence. But, we expect negotiation to dominate all
interactions: pretty much anything can be negotiated. For example, the meanings of
reporting and information gathering for concrete reforms (that is, translation) arise out
of processes of exchanges of resources. Dissemination hinges on partisan mutual
adjustment.
• Reflexively, we expect the process of information and knowledge gathering to tap into
the benefits of local innovation and diffuse good practice across the system. The key
decision-making fora—we expect—will be in search mode, looking for solutions to
fiscal problems, unemployment and poverty that originate somewhere in the system,
often at the local level (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). Translation involves changes in the
preferences of collective actors (i.e. governments) as a result of communication.
• Epistemically, we expect communities of authoritative experts with shared causal
beliefs to be key to gathering knowledge, experience and provide conceptual
frameworks for ‘translation’ (Haas 1992). Dissemination (of experience of what
works) is based on knowledge mechanisms, not on the formal hierarchical powers of
the organization. We therefore expect the decision-making fora of the Semester to be
open to technocratic solutions and inter-governmental relations to be informed by
expert’s advice.
Turning to the normative dimension of learning-as-framework, there are scope conditions
for each mode. For hierarchy to be functional, the solution must be known ex ante to
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reduce ambiguity about the type of information, knowledge and experience that is pushed
down the chain of hierarchy. Further, hierarchical learning is not efficient if the principal
does not know the production function of the agent. The European Semester indeed has
several reporting requirements that should reduce information asymmetry between the
Commission and the Council (on one hand) and the member states, on the other. The
Commission can also intervene with enhanced monitoring when more information is
needed from a country that deviates from fiscal targets. Another condition is that the
principal has legitimacy and can deploy sanctions if necessary. If, for example, a Prime
Minister complains that Germany is using the European Semester to impose its preferences
on the fiscal policy of other member states, then legitimacy is contested and the EU
institutions find it harder to deploy the corrective measures of the European Semester. In
such circumstances, learning may be blocked as defeatism takes hold.
Learning through bargaining is dominated by the logic of exchange and negotiation. An
important condition for efficient pluralism is that conflicts do not have a cumulative nature
(Lijphart 1999). Thus, our condition for functional learning under bargaining is that actors
play the European Semester negotiations without knowing whether they will gain or lose
systematically.
In the reflexivity mode, learning is functional so long as the conditions for commu-
nicative rationality and deliberation are met (Risse 2013). There is no assumption that
someone has ‘the solution’ or that correct information, knowledge and experience exist ex
ante (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). All this can only be discovered within the network of actors,
often exploiting local innovations. If the officers of the European Commission interpret
their role in the European Semester as facilitators of dialogue (as opposed to the role of
‘flow-chart’ pilots), then reflexivity is functional. However, if paradigmatic positions are
essentially incommensurable, reflexivity is dysfunctional (Pellizzoni 2001). For example,
the crisis may require discontinuity and conflict—reflexivity may protect the authority of
current decision-makers, especially if deliberation occurs only within small technocratic
groups rendering capacity uneven (Joerges and Neyer 1997).
Finally, epistemic learning is functional where the conditions for evidence-based pol-
icymaking are met and decision-makers instructed in ‘what works’ (Dunlop and Radaelli
2013). Thinking about our empirical case, the success of this mode is contingent on the
presence of a community of experts with shared causal beliefs about cause–effect rela-
tionships about the sovereign debt crisis and growth. Empirically we should observe policy
sectors of the European Semester (fiscal policy, employment, but also sustainability and
social inclusion) conforming to the logic of discovery (as opposed to adversarial power
arenas), where each innovation or idea is tested by using evidence pragmatically. But,
broadly speaking, the ‘solution’ (such as ‘austerity’ or ‘social investment’ and so on) and
the ‘lesson taught’ by the experts to policy-makers must work and in this sense be ‘correct’.
As shown by Hirschman (1970), paradigms provide their own blinkers and hindrances to
learning when thinking outside the box is vital. Where thinking becomes closed, the
potential for groupthink pathologies grows. Innovation is stifled and warning signs ignored
that the paradigm is not working according to expectations.
Turning to research design, we seek to identify the predominant modes of collective
learning, how functional they are and their power implications by studying one cycle
(2013–2014) of the European Semester, although in our project we collated material from
official documents since the inception of the Semester. We compiled a chronology of
events to support our process tracing and track episode-by-episode the annual cycle, which
starts in Fall with the Annual Growth Survey prepared by the Commission and prescribes a
certain pattern of reporting and decisions by member states and the EU institutions. We
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assembled some 250 official documents and gathered additional material from the press
and research institutes. Given the obvious limits and length of a single paper, here we focus
on the 2013–2014 cycle of the European Semester. This is the fourth cycle where the
Semester has become established and when two of the largest countries, France and Italy,
entered the grey area of deviations from the convergence targets that can be considered
temporary by some and permanent by others. We supplement official sources with material
from the Italian and French press.
The European Semester
Before we appraise the modes one-by-one, we need to provide information on context and
empirical settings. In terms of macro-economic policy, the convergence goals are based on
economic indicators, but the European Commission also monitors progress towards the
wider ‘Europe 2020’ indicators2 and social investment targets (European Commission
2013). Thus, the Commission can monitor progress towards fiscal convergence, or lack
thereof, by considering a wide range of policy areas, from climate change to social
inclusion.
The SGP was reinforced during the crisis with the aim of strengthening preventive and
corrective measures [the excessive deficit procedure (EDP)]. The new system of coordi-
nation is made up of five regulations and one directive (the so-called six-pack, December
2011) that guide governments towards structural budget balance around their medium-term
objectives. The structural budget balance operates as safety margin against breaching the
3 % headline budget deficit threshold of the SGP; it is not sensitive to cyclical changes and
one-off measures and for this reason is called ‘structural’. The six-pack contains a macro-
economic imbalance procedure (MIP) with 11 indicators—increasing the Commission’s
surveillance capability. The six-pack applies to all member states, with some provisions
that apply only to the 18 countries of the Eurozone currency area.3
The European Semester, introduced in 2010, is a policy-making calendar (summarised
in Table 1). Basically, it is an annual cycle of coordination where the governments and the
EU institutions discuss their budgets and policy reforms at specific times during the year.
Before the crisis, fiscal policy and structural reforms were channelled through different,
scattered processes.
In the European Semester, the Commission produces the annual growth strategy (AGS,
in November), reviews the fiscal and structural reforms of all 28 EU member states
(Country Reports in February), provides recommendations (so-called Country-Specific
Recommendations in May) and monitors the implementation of the recommendations. The
alert mechanism reports (AMRs) provide early warning of potentially harmful deviations
from macro-economic balance. The AMRs lead to more monitoring via ‘in-depth reviews’.
In the first annual cycle (2010–2011), 12 member states fell into the AMR mechanism, 14
during the following year.
In the second phase of the annual cycle (the National Semester), the governments are
supposed to implement the policies they have agreed. This is a system of routinized
monitoring, and iterative implementation of reforms. The Commission monitors fiscal
coordination before decisions are made at the national level. But it also transforms
2 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm.
3 For a short guide to EU fiscal governance see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/
2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm.
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Table 1 European Semester overview
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information gathering into ‘translation’—to use Heikkila and Gerlak’s concept. In fact, it
makes recommendations and monitors the performance of individual member states
towards the jobs, education, innovation, climate change and poverty reduction targets in
the EU’s long-term strategy called Europe 2020 (on the latter, see Copeland and James
2014). Hence, the annual cycle has the potential to cover a broad palette of policy reforms.
In terms of ‘dissemination’ (Heikkila and Gerlak’s third dimension of collective learning
processes), Eurozone countries are obliged to implement the recommendations of the
Commission, unless a qualified majority of those countries (excepting the country in
question) is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended. The latter is a provision of
the fiscal compact, which we illustrate next.
The fiscal compact, signed in March 2012 (binding for the euro area; other countries can
join it entirely or selectively), adds on to the architecture of surveillance and enforcement
and is intended to strengthen the SGP—formally, it is Title III of the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance (TSCG).4 The assistance provided by the European Stability
Mechanism is conditional on the signature of the Treaty and incorporation of the Treaty
rules into domestic law, preferably constitutional (art. 3.2 TSCG). The major rules are that
the budgetary position of a country should be balanced or in surplus, that the structural
deficit should not exceed 0.5 % of the GDP and that the reduction of debts over 60 % of
the GDP should take place at one twentieth per year. Art. 3 TSCG stipulates that con-
vergence towards the medium-term objective of a country should be ‘rapid’. Crucially for
our analysis of learning, ‘the timeframe for such convergence will be proposed by the
European Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks’.
Deviations from the medium-term objective or from the adjustment path are possible only
under ‘exceptional circumstances’ (art. 3, par. 1/c and par. 3/b TSCG)—events that are
outside the control of the government, ‘provided that the temporary deviation of the
Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term’.
Obviously, establishing if a circumstance is exceptional is not automatic, quite the
opposite, there are margins of judgement and appreciation. Note that governments have to
report both on deficit and on debt. On the latter, the fiscal compact rule is that they have to
report ex ante on their public debt issuance plans both to the Council and the European
Commission. One important surveillance property of the fiscal compact, indeed, is that
governments are obliged to report ex ante on all major policy reforms to the Commission
and the Council.
When a government’s economic policy breaches the thresholds of deficit or public debt,
the corrective arm enters the scene. The correction mechanism is intrusive in terms of
national policy autonomy, since it revolves around ‘common principles to be proposed by
the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, size and timeframe of the
corrective action to be undertaken, also in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the
role and independence of the institutions responsible at the national level for monitoring
compliance’ (art. 3, par. 2 TSCG). The treaty-based EDP gives the Commission a platform
to discuss the timeframe, rhythm and path to reforms with the governments that exceed the
thresholds. Governments must present a ‘budgetary and economic partnership programme’
that includes ‘a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place
and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of its excessive deficit’ (art.
5 TSCG).
4 The Treaty was signed by all EU governments bar Britain and the Czech Republic—the Czech cabinet,
however, decided to join the Treaty later on, in March 2014. Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and has not
signed yet.
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After surveillance and monitoring, the third component of the mechanism is sanction-
ing. Deviations from the fiscal compact allow the Commission (or any other government,
independently of the Commission’s views) to bring a non-compliant member state to the
Court of Justice. If this member state does not subsequently comply with the judgement of
the Court, it can be fined up to 0.1 % of GDP.
To recap on the policy coordination cycle (Table 1): after the Annual Growth Survey in
November, at the end of the calendar year member states adopt their final budgets taking
into account the opinions of the Finance Ministers meeting in the ECOFIN Council and the
advice of the Commission. In March, the AGS is discussed by the Parliament and the
relevant Council formations. At this time, countries that have been targeted by an AMR
because of their imbalances receive the in-depth reviews of the Commission. In April, all
countries (first the Eurozone countries and then the others) submit their medium-term
‘stability or convergence programmes’ and ‘national reform programmes’ (NRPs) out-
lining medium-terms objectives and the policy reforms. In May/early June, the Commis-
sion produces its evaluation of the reform plans and issues CSRs. Always in June, the
discussion of the CSRs made by the Commission goes up to the Employment Ministers
first, then to the Finance Ministers (the ECOFIN Council) and finally to the Council of
Prime Ministers and Heads of State (Council of the EU). In July, the Council of the EU
releases the final recommendations agreed/formally they are adopted by the ECOFIN
Council. The member states submit draft budget plans for the next year by mid-October,
and the cycle restarts.
Findings
In this section, we draw on empirical evidence to appraise the four varieties of learning.
Specifically, does evidence allow us to make the case for hierarchy, bargaining, reflexivity
or epistemic learning?
Learning in the shadow of hierarchy
The first, perhaps banal but still important, observation we make is that the rules are
enshrined in the Treaty and have legal binding force. Up until now (Fall 2015), no major
politically motivated upheaval of the rules of fiscal discipline and the European Semester
processes of coordination has occurred. In some episodes, compliance with the rules and
processes has come at political costs.
Take the case of Prime Minister Manuel Valls in France in 2014: he did not repeat the
move of the French and German governments of the past to use the Council to overturn a
difficult relationship with the Commission on the state of play with fiscal discipline
(Heipertz and Verdun 2010). The budgetary correction imposed by Valls to the French
parliament in the first part of 2014 generated major discontent within the majority and the
French Socialist Party—put differently, the measures were politically and electorally
painful, but were nonetheless pushed through the Assemble´e Nationale.
Second, the pyramid of monitoring, alerts and enhanced surveillance is firmly in
place—it is too costly to openly challenge this architecture in the name of ‘post-austerity’
and ‘more growth’. There have been attempts to increase flexibility with ‘social invest-
ment’ (see footnote 1), but no one wants to demolish this bastion of credibility vis a` vis the
financial markets. Third, the Commission as custodian of the hierarchical rules has the
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prime mover’s advantage, with the annual growth survey in November. It can put a
government on the spot and draw attention to imbalances that are difficult to ignore. With
the two-pack (in force since May 2013), Eurozone countries send their budgetary plans to
the Commission by mid-October, allowing a systematic and coordinated scrutiny of their
fiscal policies.
The calendar of the European Semester has been respected. Information has been sent
out regularly, procedures have been activated, and the preparation of national reforms
plans has gained prominence on the domestic policy agendas. ‘What the Commission may
say about this delay with the deficit adjustment plan’ and ‘what the Council will say about
us’ are topics that are aired every month in the press and parliamentary debates we
examined for France and Italy. The stock exchanges in France and Italy reacted quickly to
the publication of the Commission’s assessment of national reform plans in June 2014.
This contrasts with the low political and media saliency of the reporting steps in the
processes of facilitated coordination used in the past. The rules have been hardened (Borra´s
and Radaelli 2014).
Learning as bargaining
Let us turn to bargaining now. The key issue in the period we examined was always the
same: How much is a ‘given’ and how much can be negotiated? In other words, all
governments obviously want to bargain, but what are the boundaries of the negotiable? Let
us look at this episode: in September 2014, the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi said to
the press that ‘Italy does not take lessons from Europe’—a statement that the new Com-
missioner for economic and monetary affairs and the Euro, Jyrki Katainen, countered with
these words: ‘we are not teachers, we are interpreters’5 showing that powerful actors
acknowledge there is always room for negotiations.
Fiscal surveillance is definitively not an automatic flow-chart process; it is negotiated.
The Commission has agency but under conditions of ambiguity. It can, and indeed does,
negotiate. However, the agency of supranational institutions is limited by another impor-
tant bargaining force at work: the reputational power of Prime Ministers. The Commission
and the European Central Bank were hard and uncompromising during the most ferocious
speculative attacks on the euro, especially with an executive that was losing prestige and
popularity like the late Berlusconi government in Italy.6 But, the supranational voice has
been less authoritative towards new Prime Ministers with fresh reputational capital, like
Valls and Renzi. In turn, these two Prime Ministers have used high politics to try to set
limits to the autonomy of the Commission and in attempts to secure favourable treatment
from the Council.
France mobilized different high-level government officials to put pressure on the
European Central Bank to weaken the Euro in May 2014, thus giving more chances to
French competitiveness.7 The same officers put pressure on colleagues in other members of
the euro area to raise the issue of the Euro exchange rate formally. Recall, that this
happened at a time when Valls was pushing through the National Assembly a severe
5 Interview with Il Fatto Quotidiano TV; statement retrieved from the press agency www.ansa.it on 13
September 2014.
6 The famous ECB ‘confidential letter’ to Berlusconi of 5 August 2011 dictated a set or urgent reforms. It
remained secret until 29 September when Corriere della Sera published it.
7 www.globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.fr. Accessed on 10 May 2014.
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budgetary plan that cost the French Socialist Party several losses in terms of support in
Parliament and at the European Parliamentary elections of May 2014.
On 2 June 2014, the Commission evaluated the French national reform plan with little
enthusiasm, making a number of specific critical recommendations (European Commission
2014a). As explained above, the recommendations are then discussed in the Council of
Ministers and the Council of the EU in June before they are finalized in July. Unsur-
prisingly, Valls started sending signals to the press that he was negotiating with colleagues
in the Council a flexible approach to deficit rules under a period of slow growth in some
countries and recession in others, and followed with a more confrontational posture in
October 2014. France pushed the boundaries of top-down compliance towards bargaining,
if not outright conflict, with Germany and the Commission during that month, when it
decided not to go for additional budgetary corrections, thus staying above 3 % until 2017
and risking a fine up to 0.2 % of the GDP (the EDP for France is supposed to be closed
with the 3 % threshold reached in 2015). Speaking in London in early October 2014, Renzi
said that Italy ran no risk of getting into the EDP but nevertheless was supporting the
principles invoked by France: ‘I respect the decision of a free and sovereign country like
France. Nobody can treat the other member states the same way one treats students. I stand
by [President] Hollande’.8
Renzi coordinated this posture with the then Italian President Giorgio Napolitano to
create room for bargaining between Italy and the newly appointed Commission: in Fall
2014 the Italians felt that they could not reach the budget target before 2017. In conse-
quence, Renzi, his finance and economy minister Padoan and President Napolitano sought
on one hand to support the right of member states to make their voice heard by the
Commission, and on the other to exchange reforms like the Italian Jobs Act against
flexibility in the interpretation of the fiscal rules—i.e. using the investment lever to counter
the economic slowdown. Renzi in several interviews with the press in September and
October 2014 used the word ‘exchange’, especially in expressions like ‘our battle for
flexibility will allow us to stay for 3 years within the conditions we set [that is, reaching the
targets in 2017, Authors’ note] and to exchange flexibility with reforms, facilitating the
European investment plan of 300 billion Euro’.9
This bargaining logic dates back to the days of Renzi’s appointment on 22 February
2014. Already in Spring, his technical officers and Finance Minister Padoan used a meeting
in Washington to sound the then Commissioner Siim Kallas on the likelihood of the
Commission accepting a temporary deviation from the convergence target. On 16 April
2014, Padoan wrote a letter to Kallas with the Stability Programme and the National
Reform Programme for Italy. In slightly surreal prose, the letter explains the ‘slowdown of
the convergence’ in 2014, followed by an expected ‘strong convergence’ in 2015, and ‘full
convergence’ in 2016, together with a promise to privatize public assets in the range of
0.7 % of the GPD between 2014 and 2017. Kallas replied on the same day,10 saying he was
‘taking note’—a factual point that was interpreted by the Italian press as signal that the
8 Marco Galluzzo Renzi sfida Merkel: sto con la Francia, non siamo studenti, Corriere della Sera, 3 October
2014, p. 2.
9 Maria Teresa Meli Renzi ha piu` alleati. E rilancia la politica contro i tecnocrati, Corriere della Sera, 2
October 2014.
10 Both letters were retrieved from the official Italian government website www.mef.gov.it. Accessed on 20
April 2014.
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Commission was open to negotiations on an Italian slow down of deficit reduction plans.11
As mentioned, in Fall 2014 Renzi tried to shift ‘full convergence’ to 2017 instead of 2016.
Renzi has made every possible effort to bargain in the European Semester, exem-
plified in his statement that governments are not students and the Commission and
Germany cannot teach lessons. One bargaining chip that was not played, or arguably
was played wrongly, was the Italian Presidency of the EU: Renzi insisted on using the
leverage of the Presidency to press on the appointment of Mogherini as the EU’s
foreign policy representative. He was successful in that, she was appointed, but this
narrowed the opportunities for the Presidency to promote the much-sought (by the
Italians) EU-debate on post-austerity economic policy ideas and above all flexibility in
the rules.12
To conclude, how did France and Italy use the bargaining mode? In February 2015, the
Commission gave France a new deadline, granting Paris until 2017 to bring its deficit
below the EU limit of 3 %. Renzi cashed on his policy reforms13 because the Commission
decided not to open an EDP. Reportedly, within the Commission, Moscovici pushed for a
more generous deadline for France (2018) but Vice-President Dombrovskis insisted on
2017. Since the French extension materialized in the same days of a very hard re-nego-
tiation of the financial deal with Greece, this looked too much like flexibility a` la carte14
showing that too much bargaining can break down the credibility of the new governance
architecture.
Learning through reflexivity
By contrast, we found only limited evidence for reflexivity. Perhaps the strongest argument
for this mode comes from the discussion on social investment within the Employment
Council and more generally the European Semester (de la Porte 2014; Zeitlin and Van-
hercke 2014). As mentioned, the main thrust of the debate is to consider elements of public
expenditure concerning the ‘social dimension’ as investment, thus changing the total fig-
ures used to compute deficits. This can be seen as reflexivity in that the European Semester
was created to generate macro-economic coordination via surveillance. But (this is the
argument) EU policy-makers have now learned that only the ‘social’ can fix the ‘eco-
nomic’ dimension and deliver on sustainable growth. There are also ideas within the
European Commission and certain governments to present a social imbalance procedure to
fend off the socially undesirable effects of the macro-economic imbalance procedure15 (de
la Porte and Heins 2015 suggest something like that when they argue that the Eurozone
criteria should be complemented by social investment criteria).
Additional evidence for reflexivity comes from the Commission’s reaction, in June
2014, to the Italian national reform plan. The Commission issued eight recommendations
11 Marco Zatterin, Rinvio del pareggio, l’UE apre La Stampa, 17 April 2014, p. 5.
12 Francesca Schianchi Emma Bonino: Su Lady Pesc avrei fatto un’altra scelta, La Stampa, 12 September
2014.
13 Hollande too acknowledged that Italy had done more. Speaking of policy reforms he said: ‘‘En Italie,
nous le saluons et en France nous le voulons’’ (We welcome the reforms in Italy, we want the reforms in
France). Hollande et Renzi confrontent leurs re´formes. Le Figaro, 25 February 2015, p. 20.
14 EurActiv reported on German MEP Herbert Reul’s outrage to flexibility a` la carte. L’Allemange outre´
par la cle´mence de Bruxelles sur le deficit franc¸ais, 27 February 2015. www.euractiv.com. Accessed on 28
February 2015.
15 http://www.rastanews.eu/PWA_uploads/eurozone-flaws-final.pdf.
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(technically these are ‘recommendations for a Council recommendation’) to the Italian
government. The fifth, on labour market reforms, contains a reference, in line with the
Council’s endorsement of the social investment strategy (European Council 2013) ‘to
address exposure to poverty and social exclusion, scale-up the pilot social assistance
scheme, in a fiscally neutral way’ and to ‘improve the effectiveness of family support
schemes and quality services favouring low-income households with children’ (European
Commission 2014b, p. 7). The Commission pushed on social investment recommendations
across the board, especially with Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal
and Romania in the June 2014 country-specific recommendations. However, the opera-
tional and budgetary meanings of social investment are contested (Kvist 2015; de la Porte
and Heins 2015; Morel et al. 2014). Care institutions and schools are certainly a component
of social investment, but do we mean ‘any care’ and ‘any type of school’ or high-quality
care and schools?
The ‘social’ remains subordinate to the ‘economic’—the achievement of social
investment objectives is still based on voluntary coordination among member states and
weak surveillance and enforcement (de la Porte and Heins 2015). The discussion on the
social investment dimension has been more enthusiastic in the Council Committees
working on employment and social inclusion that in the pivotal ECOFIN Council. The
January 2015 communication of the Commission on flexibility (European Commission
2015) essentially restates that the only flexibility allowed to Member States is the one
already contemplated in the Treaties and the legal framework for policy coordination. At
the Franco-Italian summit in February 2015, Renzi and Hollande argued in press inter-
views about a change of direction of austerity and flexibility,16 but in their official con-
clusions they had to admit that flexibility is only ‘the one enshrined in the rules’.17
Epistemic learning
Finally, turning to epistemic learning, there is impatience with austerity in academic and
policy circles. Books and pamphlets on ‘new models of growth’ by academics and political
consultants are now common (e.g. Aghion et al. 2014 on the French debate). There is no
doubt that, in the world of ideas at least, though not in the world of public policy, we live in
a post-austerity debate. However, an alternative, internally coherent, widely shared (among
experts) paradigm has not emerged. There are many possible alternatives: economists and
social scientists have not converged on the post-austerity model.
The Commission has mobilized its Horizon 2020 funds for EU-wide research to gen-
erate more expertise, with four calls in 2014 for projects dedicated to the crisis. Interest-
ingly, in Horizon 2020 there is an explicit reference to more research on the ideational
roots of the crisis, showing that the officers at the Commission believe that policy ideas
matter. But ultimately, the Commission has a process goal in ideational politics, not an
outcome goal. Given its limited legitimacy and capacity, it can only orchestrate existing
research and keep momentum with the flow of ideas. It cannot possibly steer an epistemic
community in the field of macro-economic policy and growth and generate consensus
towards one model or another.
16 Carlos Ya´rnoz, Hollande y Renzi presumen de liderar el giro politico de la UE. El Pais 25 February 2015,
p. 3. (Note the emphasis on ‘they presume’ in the title…‘‘Hollande and Renzi presume to lead the political
game of the EU’’).
17 Pre´sidence de la Republique: Releve´ de conclusions du XXXIIe`me sommet franco-italien. Paris, 25
February 2015. ‘‘Flexibilite´ inscrite dans le re`gles’’ (p. 6).
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Discussion and conclusions
Our evidence is preliminary and limited to two countries and a single cycle of the Euro-
pean Semester. With these caveats, our analysis exemplifies how learning-as-framework
performs. Our evidence points to bargaining and hierarchy rather than epistemic learning
or reflexivity. As for the second question on the power of institutional actors, the Com-
mission has constrained agenda-setting abilities. Its agency is bounded by high politics, the
reputational capital of Prime Ministers and ultimately the agreements taken in the various
Council formations. Much of what the Commission does, or does not do, depends on a
mechanism of anticipated reactions: we have seen above that technically the Commission
presents ‘recommendations for Council’s recommendations’ and there is no point in
proposing something aggressive towards a member state if the Council is bound to reject
the proposal a few weeks later. Our conclusions support the findings of other recent studies
that describe a redirection of the roles of the Commission rather than fundamental change
and an increase in its implementation competencies—but not necessarily in agenda setting
(Savage and Verdun 2015; Schwarzer 2012; Bauer and Becker 2014).
Thus, we can exploit the theoretical leverage of learning-as-framework to build bridges
between learning and power. In our cases, to learn is a way to define power relations more
precisely, to pin down the area for agency and to test power in crucial episodes. There is
another, perhaps more subtle, lesson about power and learning: actors compete over the
selection of learning modes. The Commission goes for bargaining when this increases its
leverage over solutions, but it goes back to the hierarchical rulebook when its power is
threatened. Brussels seems to prefer a bargaining mode with France, but can be more
hierarchical towards Greece. Future research should establish whether the Commission and
the Council select one mode or another depending on the characteristics of a member state.
Finally, this leads us to the normative implications. Bargaining and hierarchy prevail,
but the conditions for the functional use of these modes are not met. In bargaining mode,
those demanding concessions are always countries like France and Italy. By contrast,
bargaining is functional if positions are reshuffled over time. The dysfunctional state of
play has not (yet) cemented into a Franco-Italian coalition18 mostly because of the different
structural position of the two countries (only France is within the EDP) and because of the
political risks of opening explicit hostilities with Germany—which would mean re-nego-
tiating the Treaty on Stability and Growth and the architecture of the European Semester.19
In the Commission appointed in 2014, the new French Commissioner, Moscovici, has
limited room for manoeuvre—he is subordinate to strong supporters of the ‘hierarchical’
mode. This threatens to polarize positions and create situations that are difficult to sustain
politically, as shown by the domestic problems encountered by Valls and Hollande in
France and their, perhaps desperate, attempt to confront Germany in early October 2014,
after having suffered huge popularity and electoral losses to the advantage of the extreme
right-wing Front National.
18 Massimo Franco, ‘‘La crescita invocate come antidoto alla crisi’’ Corriere della Sera, 2 October 2014
argued that ‘‘the dream of a Franco-Italian axis is suggestive as well as it is controversial’’.
19 The Italian economist Lucrezia Reichlin is close to suggesting to go beyond the literal interpretation of
the Treaty, arguably with a modification of the underlying regulations in her editorial for the main Italian
daily newspaper La cosa giusta che non facciamo, Corriere della Sera, 3 October 2014, pp. 1–2. On
modifying the underlying regulations, see Alberto D’Aregnio, Asse di ferro Renzi-Napolitano, La Repub-
blica, 4 October 2014, pp. 6–7.
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Neither did we find the conditions for functional hierarchical learning. In fact, the
‘solution’ is not known in advance, as shown by the objective difficulty of establishing
among many other things the exact meaning of ‘slowdown’, ‘strong’ and ‘full’ conver-
gence—to paraphrase Padoan’s letter to Kallas. Fundamentally, there is no shared belief on
how to re-kindle growth in Europe and the precise implications of social investment are
contested.
This ambiguity about growth mechanisms in the current economic conditions is exactly
the reason why we find so much bargaining. The officers at DGECFIN of the Commission
have no way of predicting whether the Italian government is right in making commitments
about privatization and the temporary nature of the Italian deviation from the balanced
budget target. These officers are in Brussels, not in Rome, and even if they were in Rome they
would not be able to predict basic facts like the duration of an Italian government. All this
suggests dysfunctional learning: the conditions for ‘hierarchy’ and ‘bargaining’ are not met.
Our findings show that learning-as-framework is useful to identify the prevalent mode of
learning and to find out whether an organization or political system learns functionally or
not. Does learning-as-framework also suggest reforms? We argue that for the EU, the
solution is either to adopt other varieties of learning like reflexivity (perhaps via the ‘social
investment’ debate and new shared beliefs on growth) and epistemic learning (if a new post-
austerity intellectual consensus emerges one day soon), or to work on the scope conditions
for functional learning in the prevailing modes of bargaining and hierarchy. More explicit
mutuality in the EU would alleviate the problems with bargaining—where individual
member states try to dominate. Something like this may appear from outside the European
Semester, with the current activity on the Banking Union. Or, thinking of the scope con-
dition for hierarchy, the Commission and the Council could intensify the implementation of
fiscal surveillance provisions to reduce asymmetries between principal and agents, but with
increasing problems of legitimacy and reduced policy autonomy at home for democratically
elected governments. One way or another, the road to fiscal convergence, reforms and
growth presents a set of difficult choices for the EU’s policy-makers.
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